Neste trabalho estudamos a noçáo popperiana de "eu" e concluimos que, no marco do racionalismo critico, O sujeito é conhecedor e o individuo empírico; porém o mesmo náo deve ser pensado como uma natureza psicológica anterior as estruturas sociais mas sim como um artificio institucional.

Although the knowledge about biological systems has advanced exponentially in recent decades, it is surprising to realize that the very definition of Life keeps presenting theoretical challenges. Even if several lines of reasoning seek to identify the essence of life phenomenon, most of these thoughts contain fundamental problem in their basic conceptual structure. Most concepts fail to identify either necessary or sufficient features to define life. Here, we analyzed the main conceptual frameworks regarding theoretical aspects that have been supporting the (...) most accepted concepts of life, such as (i) the physical, (ii) the cellular and (iii) the molecular approaches. Based on an ontological analysis, we propose that Life should not be positioned under the ontological category of Matter. Yet, life should be better understood under the top-level ontology of “Process”. Exercising an epistemological approach, we propose that the essential characteristic that pervades each and every living being is the presence of organic codes. Therefore, we explore theories in biosemiotics and code biology in order to propose a clear concept of life as a macrocode composed by multiple inter-related coding layers. This way, as life is a sort of metaphysical process of encoding, the living beings became the molecular materialization of that process. From the proposed concept, we show that the evolutionary process is a fundamental characteristic for life’s maintenance but it is not necessary to define life, as many organisms are clearly alive but they do not participate in the evolutionary process (such as infertile hybrids). The current proposition opens a fertile field of debate in astrobiology, epistemology, biosemiotics, code biology and robotics. (shrink)

The Darwinian revolution supposed and imposed a much broader and more complex concept of environment than that which, until that moment, had been considered by most as part of natural history. Until Darwin, the environment of living beings had been regarded, almost exclusively, as the inanimate surroundings. This pre-Darwinian notion of environment included physicochemical and climatic variables: the living beings themselves were scarcely considered, or they were regarded just as food to be assimilated. In contrast, with Darwin, the influence of (...) living surroundings began to be regarded as having decisive importance for understanding the distribution, configuration, and viability of living beings. The relationships established among different living beings became the main and more significant features of the biological environment. This conceptual change was an exigency derived from the formulation and justification of the theory of natural selection. The idea of struggle for existence supposed by that theory requires that the biotic environment be considered critical in determining the viability of each living being. (shrink)

RESUMEN Se analiza si la versión de la justicia como equidad, presentada en El liberalismo político, es genuinamente una concepción política. Se examina el problema de la razonabilidad de las doctrinas comprehensivas, y se indaga luego si el argumento en dos etapas afecta la integridad estructural del liberalismo político. Se concluye que J. Rawls fracasa en su intento de justificar un liberalismo independiente de una doctrina comprehensiva de carácter liberal. ABSTRACT The article analyzes whether the conception of justice as fairness, (...) set forth by Rawls in Political Liberalism, is a genuine political conception. It first examines the issue of reasonableness of comprehensive doctrines and then goes on to inquire whether the two-step argument affects the structural integrity of political liberalism. The paper concludes that J. Rawls fails in his attempt to justify liberalism independently of a comprehensive liberal doctrine. (shrink)

Contrariando la concepción etiológica de las funciones biológicas, se pretende mostrar que las explicaciones por selección natural, lejos de justificar atribuciones funcionales, las presuponen; y que estas atribuciones pueden ser entendidas apelando a una especificación particular de la concepción s..

Admitiendo la distinción propuesta por Mayr entre biología funcional y biología evolutiva, sugerimos que estos dos dominios de investigación siguen dos distintos modos de considerar lo viviente que pueden ser entendidos, pero en dos sentidos diferentes, como teleológicos. Para distinguir esas dos formas de teleología hacemos una comparación entre la explicación funcional típica de la biología funcional y la explicación seleccional propia de la biología evolutiva. Cada uno de estos tipos de explicación obedece a una regla metodológica especial: la explicación (...) funcional sigue al principio de adecuación autopoiética; y la explicación seleccional sigue al principio de adecuación adaptativa. Pero, mientras el primero será presentado como estando subordinado a un principio general da causación; el segundo será presentado como siendo independiente de él. Finalmente, en el contexto de una breve discusión relativa al concepto de symmorphosis, sostenemos que, en la biología contemporánea, la noción de adecuación adaptiva es preeminente sobre la noción de adecuación funcional: esta encuentra su fundamento en aquella.Admitting Mayr’s distinction between functional and evolutionary biology we suggest that these two dominions of inquiry follow two different modes of onsider the living that can be considered, but in two different senses, as being teleological. To distinguish these two forms of teleology we make a comparison between the functional explanation, typical of functional biology, and the selective explanation, proper of evolutionary biology. Each one of this kind of explanation obeys an special methodological rule: the functional explanation follows the principle of autopoietic adequacy; and the selective explanation follows the principle of adaptive adequacy. But, while the former principle will be presented as being subordinated to a general principle of causation; the later will be presented as being independent of it. Finally, in the context of a brief discussion concerning the concept of symmorphosis, we argue that, in contemporary biology, the notion of adaptive adequacy is preeminent over the notion of functional adequacy: the later find its fundament in the former. (shrink)

The term ideology is usually used in three different senses, each of which alludes to a different concept: ideology in the sense originally proposed by Marx and Engels; ideology as a political thought, which ended up being the most frequently used notion; and ideology as a bias that affects the positions that can be adopted in the field of theory. This last notion will be analyzed here; trying to show its difference, but also its relationships, with the other two notions. (...) An attempt will also be made to establish a difference between the notions of ideological bias and of political position in theory. (shrink)

En sus Principios de biología de 1864, Spencer esboza una complementación entre el cuvierianismo transformacional mitigado que daba sentido a la idea de equilibración directa ahí presentada, y la teoría de la selección natural que Darwin ya había formulado en 1859. Era a este último mecanismo que Spencer denominaba "equilibración indirecta". Según Spencer, esta segunda forma de equilibración permitía explicar fenómenos evolutivos que la primera, la equilibración directa, no podía causar; aunque para él también era evidente que el accionar de (...) esa segunda equilibración debía siempre subordinarse al control de la primera. In his Principles of Biology, published in 1864, Spencer outlines a complementarity between the mitigated transformational cuvierianism that was in the basis of his idea of direct equilibration, and the theory of the natural selection that Darwin had already formulated in 1859. Spencer called the mechanism of natural selection indirect equilibration. According to him, this second form of equilibration enabled the explanation of some evolutionary phenomena that could not be caused by direct equilibration. However, for Spencer, it was clear that the operation of this second equilibration had to be always subordinated to the control of the first one. (shrink)

Review of "Introdução à Teoria da ciência", de Luiz Henrique de A. Dutra.

RESUMENSegún un punto de vista muy difundido, y alineado con la concepción nómica de la explicación causal, la biología funcional está sometida a un régimen de heteronomía explicativa en cuyo marco los fenómenos orgánicos deben explicarse causalmente recurriendo a leyes oriundas de la física y la química. En contra de esa perspectiva, la concepción experimental de la causación permite entender la naturaleza de muchas explicaciones biológicas que, sin hacer referencia a leyes causales - físicas, químicas o de cualquier otra naturaleza (...) - se legitiman por el hecho de ponernos en condiciones de controlar experimentalmente fenómenos relativos al funcionamiento y a la constitución de los organismos. Esas explicaciones suponen invariantes locales que muchas veces, pero no necesariamente, podrán llegar a ser caracterizados como instancias de leyes físico-químicas. ABSTRACTIn accordance with a widespread point of view, aligned with the nomological conception of causal explanation, Functional Biology is subjected to a regime of explanatory heteronomy under which, organic phenomena should be causally explained by using laws of Physics and Chemistry. Against this perspective, the experimental conception of causation allows us to understand the nature of many biological explanations that, without make any reference to causal laws - physical, chemical or of other nature - are legitimized because they permit the experimental control of phenomena that have to do with the functioning and development of organisms. These explanations involve local invariants that often, but not necessarily, may be characterized as instances of physical and chemical laws. (shrink)

En la Teoría de la Selección Natural, el concepto de función biológica debe suponerse para delimitar el concepto de aptitud; y éste debe suponerse para delimitar el concepto de adaptación y también para explicar el fenómeno al que este último alude. Esos tres conceptos, por otra parte, son especificaciones de tres conceptos de aplicación más universal. El concepto de función biológica es un caso particular del concepto general de función; y el concepto de aptitud especifica el concepto de eficiencia. El (...) concepto de adaptación, mientras tanto, es una especificación del concepto de diseño. La visualización de esas articulaciones conceptuales permite entender la legitimidad de la naturalización de la teleología operada por el darwinismo.In Natural Selection Theory, the concept of biological function must be supposed to elucidate the concept of fitness; and this one must be supposed to elucidate the concept of adaptation and also to explain the phenomenon to which the last one alludes. These three concepts, on the other hand, are specificationsof three concepts of more universal application. The concept of biological function is a particular case of the general concept of function; and the concept of fitness is a specification of the concept of efficiency. The concept of adaptation, meanwhile, specifies the concept of design. The visualization of these conceptualjoints allows to understanding the legitimacy of the naturalization of the teleology produced by the Darwinism. (shrink)

El objetivo de este trabajo es caracterizar el concepto etológico de comportamiento. Un concepto que no se aplica indiscriminadamente a cualquier respuesta que un ser vivo pueda dar a los estímulos de sus medios externo e interno; sino que sólo se refiere a cierto tipo particular de reacciones biológicas: aquellas pasibles de ser direccionadas, y funcionalmente optimizadas, en virtud de procesos de aprendizaje guiados por cogniciones. Eso, además de exigirnos una caracterización muy amplia, pero ciertamente muy poco exigente, de lo (...) que hemos entender por cognición; también contribuye a establecer la centralidad y legitimidad de la Etología Cognitiva dentro el universo de los estudios etológicos. (shrink)

As observações de Georges Canguilhem sobre a novidade implícita na noção darwiniana de ambiente são um exemplo da capacidade heurística de sua maneira de entender a história dos conceitos. De fato, o que Canguilhem nos permite ver é que a noção de meio ambiente implícita na teoria da seleção natural é um elemento alheio e superveniente à dupla filiação, física e antropogeográfica, das formas de pensar sobre o meio ambiente que até então tinham orientado os estudos fisiológicos e a própria (...) História Natural. (shrink)

La idea de herencia extendida se ha transformado en un leitmotiv de lo que se ha dado en llamar ‘síntesis extendida’. Dicha idea, entretanto, lleva a ignorar una de las marcas distintivas de lo que clásicamente se ha entendido por transmisión hereditaria: su estrecha asociación con el proceso de reproducción. Sin considerar tal asociación, la noción de herencia, más que ampliarse, de hecho se disuelve; y aceptar esa disolución acarrearía demasiadas dificultades para el discurso de las ciencias biológicas. Una de (...) esas dificultades tiene que ver con el concepto de variación hereditaria. Con la disolución de la noción de herencia, ese concepto también se disolvería; y, sin éste, la Teoría de la Selección Natural no puede articularse. Pero, no habiendo motivos valederos para aceptar semejante costo teórico, aquí quiero mostrar que ambos conceptos, el de herencia y el de variación hereditaria, pueden y deben ser elucidados sin aceptar la idea de herencia ampliada. (shrink)

En los últimos años, algunos autores han venido sosteniendo que la validez de la representación arborescente del patrón filético generado por la evolución está siendo menoscabada por el reconocimiento del impacto evolutivo que tendrían la transferencia genética horizontal, la simbiogénesis, la especiación por hibridación y la introgresión. Esa concepción o representación cladogenética de la evolución sólo nos dejaría ver un aspecto parcial de las relaciones de filiación que conectan a los diferentes linajes de seres vivos; ocultando otro aspecto cuya representación (...) más adecuada sería un reticulado de relaciones entre taxones. Con todo, aún sin poner en tela de juicio la frecuencia y la relevancia explicativa de dichos fenómenos, en este trabajo se intentará mostrar que su admisión y reconocimiento no tiene por qué ir en detrimento de esa concepción cladogenética de la evolución cuya relativización se está pregonando. Por el contrario, la comprensión y la representación de tales fenómenos supone dicha concepción. Palabras clave: Filogénesis, Especiación por hibridación, Introgresión, Simbiogénesis, TGH. (shrink)

No século XIX, o progresso da biologia evolutiva esteve pautado por dois programas de pesquisa: um de desenvolvimento mais amplo e com maior reconhecimento institucional, que foi o programa filogenético; e outro, o programa adaptacionista, cujo desenvolvimento foi mais restrito ou até mesmo marginal. Fritz Müller (1822-1897) contribuiu para ambas as agendas de pesquisa. Sua contribuição pioneira para o programa filogenético, está em seu livro Für Darwin. Instigado pelo próprio Darwin, também obteve resultados de pesquisa que foram marcos para a (...) consolidação do programa adaptacionista, como por exemplo, seus trabalhos sobre mimetismo. (shrink)

El arquetipo vertebrado delineado por Richard Owen a mediados del Siglo XIX fue un modelo concebido para pautar el análisis morfológico de los seres vivos dentro de los lineamientos definidos por la idea de una unidad de composición cuando ella se aplicaba al caso específico de los vertebrados. Pero aquí, además de analizar la razón de ser originaria de ese arquetipo y su modo de operar dentro del contexto epistémico en el que efectivamente surgió, también aludiremos al modo en que (...) ese modelo pudo pasar a ser considerado, no ya como una idealización, o una abstracción metodológicamente operativa, sino como una aproximación a una entidad real que debía ser individualizada y debidamente descripta. (shrink)

Firstly, in this article it is examined the nature of the putative remarks concerning evolution of species that are found in the works that Richard Owen published before 1858; and then it is made the same thing with the few and vague evolutionist conjectures that Owen certainly made after the public presentation of Natural Selection Theory. Regarding the former topic, the goal will be to highlight the ambiguity of those Owen’s remarks, and concerning the latter topic what is looked for (...) is to show that, when he explained his transmutationist thesis, Owen didn’t go beyond a pious theistic evolutionism, without postulating any mechanism of evolutionary change and remaining faithful to Design Theology praised by Paley. (shrink)

Having as starting point that a proximal cause is one which effects can be registered in the states of an individual organism, in this work I will argue that what defines an ultimate cause is the fact that its effects can be registered in the evolution of lineages, and not simply in population states. This, on the other hand, not only will allow us to clarify how the developmental constraints can be understood as causes of the evolutionary phenomena; but also (...) it will allow us to point the eminently historical character of Developmental Evolutionary Biology that Wallace Arthur lessened in Biased Embryos and Evolution. Thus, and following this latter reasoning, I will also try to show that, although the action of developmental constraints could happen beyond the limits of a population or a particular species, that does not imply that we are before a comeback of typological thought in Evolutionary Biology. (shrink)

Asumiendo y profundizando la distinción entre Biología Funcional y Biología Evolutiva conforme ha sido propuesta por Ernst Mayr y François Jacob, comparamos la naturaleza de los procedimientos experimentales que se realizan en uno y otro dominio de las ciencias de la vida. En vistas a esto, introducimos ciertas precisiones sobre las nociones de observación y experimento e intentamos elucidar los presupuestos sobre los que se apoya la experimentación en biología funcional. A continuación, presentamos los fundamentos y las particularidades de los (...) procedimientos experimentales desarrollados en el contexto de ese capítulo de la biología evolutiva que es la genética de poblaciones, y analizamos las peculiaridades de las variables sobre la que estos se ejercen. Esto nos permite mostrar la diferencia radical que existe entre operar sobre variables poblacionales y operar sobre variables fisiológicas.In this article we compare the nature of the experimental procedures that are carried out in different areas of biology. This is done by accepting and deepening the distinction between Functional and Evolutive Biology as it is argued for by Ernst Mayr and François Jacob. Keeping this in mind, we introduce some remarks on the notions of observation and experiment and try to clear up the presuppositions on the basis of which experimentation in Functional Biology rest. In the wake of it, we show the foundations and the main aspects of those experimental procedures that are developed in the context of that chapter of Evolutive Biology called Genetics of Populations and analyze the peculiarities of the variables by which those experiments are carried out. This allows us to show the radical difference between working on population and physiological variables. (shrink)

In Philosophy of Biology, but also in Philosophy of Mind, in Ethics, in Epistemology, and even in Aesthetics, the term naturalization is usually used in two different ways. It is often used in a meta-philosophical sense to indicate a way for doing philosophy that, in some way, would approximate this reflection to scientific research. But it is also often used in a meta-theoretical sense. In that case, it is used to characterize an explanatory operation proper to science. Sometimes, this scientific (...) operation consists of explaining, in natural science terms, what was previously explained by recourse to the supernatural. Other times, this explanatory operation would result in a biological explanation of what, up to that moment, was explained above in terms of the Social Sciences. In the first situation, the natural is understood as the opposite of the supernatural; and science seeks to advance on that domain, producing cognitive progress. In the second situation, the natural is understood as the opposite of the secular; and Biology advances on that sphere, but not without running the risk of operating as an ideology capable of legitimating unjust and avoidable inequalities. This does not necessarily have to be so, but thought must guard against that risk. (shrink)

El termino ideología suele ser usado en tres sentidos diferentes; cada uno de los cuáles alude a un concepto de diferente: la ideología en el sentido originalmente propuesto por Marx y Engels; la ideología como ideario político, que termino siendo la noción de uso más frecuente; y la ideología como sesgo que afecta las posiciones que pueden adoptarse en el campo de la teoría. Aquí será analizada esta última noción; tentando mostrar su diferencia, pero también sus relaciones, con las otras (...) dos nociones. También se intentará establecer una diferencia entre las nociones de sesgo ideológico en la teoría y posición política en la teoría. (shrink)

Los efectos neolamarckianos, más allá de cuál sea su soporte estructural, son incapaces de explicar la evolución adaptativa; aunque, en algunos casos, ellos sí puedan ser un mecanismo interviniente en dicho proceso. Los efectos neolamarckianos, si ocurren, siempre deben quedar sometidos al control de la selección natural. Valiendo para ellos lo que vale para cualquier variación hereditaria que pueda surgir al interior de una población; sin importar si esas variaciones son genéticas o epigenéticas. Por otra parte, por sí solos, dichos (...) efectos sólo pueden generar cambios evolutivos muy limitados. En lo que atañe a esos asuntos, el recurso a la herencia epigenética no cambia los términos del problema con el que Darwin se enfrentó cuando enunció la Teoría de la Selección Natural. (shrink)

La distinción propuesta por Ernst Mayr y François Jacob entre biología funcionaly biología evolutiva es una clave fundamental para un tratamiento claro y concluyente de dos problemas que, recurrentemente, se colocan en el ámbito de la Filosofía de la Biología: aquel que atañe al posible carácter teleológico de las explicaciones biológicas y aquel relativo a la autonomía de la Biología en relación a la Física y a la Química. Sin sostener una alternativa de solución para ninguno de estos problemas, presentamos (...) esa oposición mostrando su relevancia para el tratamiento de tales cuestiones. Nuestra idea es que las mismas no deberían plantearse sin especificar a cual de los dos dominios de la ciencias de la vida nos estamos refiriendo.Mayr’s and Jacob’s distinction between functional biology and evolutionary biology is a fundamental key for a clearer and more conclusive treatment of two problems that, currently, are discussed in Philosophy of Biology: that which matter to the teleological character of biological explanations and that which matter to the autonomy of Biology from Physic and Chemistry. Without hold any alternative solution for none of these problems, we present that opposition showing its relevance for the treatment of both questions. Our idea is that these problems shouldn’t be posed without a specification of the domain of Biology that is being considered. (shrink)

Ratifying Haeckel and contradicting Kant’s negative prophesy, in this paper I try to show that Darwin was, really, the Newton of the blade of grass. Darwin showed how the configurations according to goals of the living beings, could be explained from a naturalistic point of view, without having to postulate the existence of an intentional agent that had arranged or prearranged then. This achievement, nevertheless, was obtained by a way that Kant could not foresee and that Haeckel could not understand: (...) Darwin came there showing that there was more natural science than that Newton, Kant and Haeckel could conceive. (shrink)

The main cognitive target of Ecology is the functional analysis of the ecological processes and systems. It does not suppose, meanwhile, that these processes and systems are designed systems and processes like individual leaving beings. The Ecology, likewise Physiology, is constitutively guided by the presupposition of a privileged state, to be explained, that it is the persistence of the systems and processes that she studied; and its functional analyses obey to this presupposition. Ecology supposes an ideal of natural order, under (...) which consideration this privileged state is thinking as an improbable state of things and, for that, needed of explanation; and, in what concerns this latter point, the analogy between Ecology and Physiology can also result instructive. • DOI:10.5007/1808-1711.2010v14n3p349. (shrink)

Publicado en 1865, el mismo año de la publicación de la _Introduction a L’Étude de la Médecine Expérimentale_, el artículo “Du progrès dans les sciences physiologiques” discute aquellos presupuestos del de la Fisiología Experimental que más reticencias suscitaban en la comunidad de médicos y fisiólogos a los que Claude Bernard quería persuadir sobre la viabilidad y fertilidad de su programa de investigación. Claude Bernard pone en evidencia la raigambre vitalista de muchos de las suspicacias suscitadas por la experimentación con seres (...) vivos; y también muestra que la organización funcional no es un obstáculo para el desarrollo de esa estrategia de investigación que él patrocinaba. Por el contrario, esa organización es un presupuesto indiscutible, aunque también inexplicable, de todo abordaje experimental de los seres vivos. (shrink)

Normal 0 21 false false false PT-BR X-NONE X-NONE MicrosoftInternetExplorer4 /* Style Definitions */ table.MsoNormalTable {mso-style-name:"Tabela normal"; mso-tstyle-rowband-size:0; mso-tstyle-colband-size:0; mso-style-noshow:yes; mso-style-priority:99; mso-style-qformat:yes; mso-style-parent:""; mso-padding-alt:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt; mso-para-margin-top:0cm; mso-para-margin-right:0cm; mso-para-margin-bottom:10.0pt; mso-para-margin-left:0cm; line-height:115%; mso-pagination:widow-orphan; font-size:11.0pt; font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif"; mso-ascii-font-family:Calibri; mso-ascii-theme-font:minor-latin; mso-hansi-font-family:Calibri; mso-hansi-theme-font:minor-latin; mso-fareast-language:EN-US;} Así como la permanencia de la forma ancestral primitiva puede ser considerada como el ideal de orden natural de la Teoría de la Selección Natural ; la postulación de un morfoespacio virtual regularmente ocupado, puede ser considerada como una aproximación satisfactoria (...) al ideal de orden natural de la Biología Evolucionaria Desenvolvimiental. Por eso, mientras la Teoría de la Selección Natural nos provee los recursos para explicar la razón de ser de la ocupación efectiva del morfoespacio que se produce con cada innovación morfológica producida por la evolución, la Biología Evolucionaria Desenvolvimiental pretende darnos a conocer los factores que, con independencia de la selección natural, explican el hecho de que esa ocupación del morfoespacio sea sesgada o irregular . Palabras Clave: Toulmin; Biología Evolucionaria Desenvolvimiental; Ideal de orden natural; Morfoespacio. (shrink)

Segundo Daniel Dennett insistiu em diferentes trabalhos, o programa adaptacionista darwiniano constitui uma legítima e insubstituível translação da perspectiva intencional ao domínio da biologia. Mas, para que essa tese possa ser formulada com toda clareza, e não fique no plano da simples metáfora – coisa que não é o objetivo de Dennett – é necessário esclarecer qual seria o sistema intencional cujo comportamento estudamos conforme essa perspectiva. Assim, e contra a alternativa escolhida pelo próprio Dennett, e retomando uma proposta do (...) Karl Popper, sustentaremos que esse sistema não é a natureza como um tudo, mas sim o sistema constituído por uma população ou uma linhagem de organismos: eles são os agentes dos processos adaptativos. Não é nossa meta, entretanto, contradizer as teses centrais da Dennett; mas sim as reforçar.How do species think? Daniel Dennett has insisted in different occasions that Darwin’s Adaptationist Program constitutes a legitimate and hardly displaceable translation of the intentional point of view in the Biology field. However, in order for us to be able to state this thesis clearly and to avoid getting into the domain of mere metaphor – which is not Dennett’s purpose -, we have to single out what intentional system the behaviour of which we study on such a perspective. That being noted, we shall argue, contrary to the alternative that Dennett himself picked out, and close to Karl Popper’s suggestion, that such a system is not nature as a whole, but the system made up by a population or a class of organisms: those are the agents of the adaptative processes. We do not, however, aim at contradicting Dennett’s overall strategy; rather, we aim at reinforcing it. (shrink)

Species can be defined as a lineage of populations among which was never set up an micro-evolutionary isolation, and what is meant by ‘micro-evolutionary isolation’ is this: two populations are micro-evolutionarily isolated, if and only if, the micro-evolutionary processes affecting one of them (namely: natural selection, genetic drift, sexual selection, mutation and/or migration) cannot reach the other. This is a delimitation of the evolutionary species concept that is compatible and solidary with the conceptual division of labor that some authors have (...) proposed to solve the problem raised by the definition of species. (shrink)

Taking as a starting point Brandon's account of the principle of natural selection, we argue that it is possible to consider such a principle as bearing the same status of the principle of causation, to wit, that of a methodological rule whose function would be to introduce a "teleological mode of inquiring the living". This way of understanding the principle of natural selection will drive us into an interpretation of Darwinism that is close to that one argued for by Daniel (...) Dennett. (shrink)

Cuvier’s confidence in the possibility of reconstructing the way of life of an extinct animal from a complete knowledge of its anatomy and its physiology could make us think that his program for paleontology somewhat anticipated Darwinian adaptacionism. Nevertheless, even if this interpretation seems reasonable, it ignores the cognitive aims and the fundamental presuppositions of the Cuvierian program. This ignorance conspires against a correct evaluation of the meaning and the impact of the results obtained by Cuvier in the study of (...) fossils. The relevance of those results is in showing that extinct living beings were subordinated to the same laws of organization as living beings existing today. (shrink)

RESUMEN: La idea de selección interna, propuesta originalmente por Lancelot Whyte, no sólo sirve para entender el papel causal que los constreñimientos del desarrollo tienen en evolución; sino que además puede hacernos comprender de qué modo esos factores organísmicos o internos, cuya importancia la Biología Evolucionaria del Desarrollo hoy quiere rescatar, son pasibles de ser considerados desde una perspectiva variacional o seleccional compatible, pero no asimilable, a la Teoría de la Selección Natural. Así, considerado como un concepto autónomo y diferente (...) al de selección natural, el concepto de selección interna puede permitirnos comprender de qué modo eso que Wallace Arthur llama developmental bias constituye una causa, efectiva y positiva, de transformacionesevolutivas irreversibles y acumulables.ABSTRACT: The idea of internal selection, originally proposed by Lancelot Whyte, not only helps to understand the causal role that the developmental constraints have in evoltion, but it can also show how these organismic or internal factors, which relevancy the Evolutionary Developmental Biology remarks today, can be considered from a variational or selectional perspective that is compatible with, but not reducible to, Natural Selection Theory. Thus, being considered as a concept autonomous and different from natural selection, the concept of internal selection can allow us to understand how that phenomenon that Wallace Arthur calls developmental bias constitutes an effective and positive cause of irreversible and cumulative evolutionary changes. (shrink)

El objetivo de este trabajo es poner al descubierto los principales valores cognitivos y epistemológicos desde los que Warren Weaver puso en marcha el Programa de Biología Experimental, un programa que llevado a cabo desde la presidencia de la división de ciencias naturales de la Fundación Rockefeller, marcó y condicionó en buena medida el posterior desarrollo de la investigación biológica. Para tal fin se mostrará, en primer lugar, cómo fue la llegada de Weaver a la Fundación Rockefeller, así como las (...) razones bajo las cuáles el consejo de esa institución decidió entre 1932 y 1933 dar prioridad a las investigaciones biomédicas, y la manera por la cual lo hicieron. En un segundo momento, el más extenso e importante, veremos algunos de los elementos más significativos de la perspectiva epistemológica y cognoscitiva de de Weaver. Finalizaremos viendo cómo esa perspectiva, desarrollada en conexión con el Programa de Biología Experimental, inter-actuó con la visión reduccionista de la biología a la que el programa parecía apuntar. The aim of this article is to uncover the main cognitive and epistemological values that influenced Warren Weaver in starting the Experimental Biology Program, a program carried out from the time that he became president of the Natural Sciences Division of the Rockefeller Foundation, and which significantly marked and conditioned the subsequent development of biological research. To this end, we first describe the arrival of Warren Weaver at the Rockefeller Foundation, and the reasons for which the Board of this Foundation, between 1932 and 1933, decided to prioritize biomedical research, and the manner in which they did so. Then, secondly, in the largest and most important part of the article, we will present some of the most significant elements of Weaver's epistemological and cognitive perspective. Finally, we will show how this perspective, developed in connection with the Experimental Biology Program, interacted with the reductionist view of biology to which the program seemed to point. (shrink)

The distinction between evolutionary and functional biology is a fundamental clue to a conclusive approach of one of the most controversial issues in the philosophy of biology: the possibility of reducing biology to physics and chemistry. The questions that defines the cognitive targets of functio..

El contenido del libro lo integran trabajos presentados por algunos de los más importantes filósofos anglosajones del derecho penal, todos ellos profesores en aquel momento en el Reino Unido. Dichos trabajos fueron discutidos por penalistas, filósofos y criminólogos de habla hispana provenientes de España, Argentina y Chile. En este sentido, el workshop ejemplificó también el tipo de acercamiento que los distintos mundos académicos, en este caso el mundo anglosajón y el hispano, o de forma más general el mundo jurídico del (...) common law y el de la tradición europea continental, están viviendo en estos días. (shrink)

In this paper we present an embedding of abstract argumentation systems into the framework of Barwise and Seligmans logic of information flow. We show that, taking P.M. Dungs characterization of argument systems, a local logic over states of a deliberation may be constructed. In this structure, the key feature of non-monotonicity of commonsense reasoning obtains as the transition from one local logic to another, due to a change in certain background conditions. Each of Dungs extensions of argument systems leads to (...) a corresponding ordering of background conditions. The relations among extensions becomes a relation among partial orderings of background conditions. This introduces a conceptual innovation in Barwise and Seligmans representation of commonsense reasoning. (shrink)

This paper questions the notion that states may be justified in denying certain prisoners the right to vote as a means of distancing themselves from particularly grave wrongs. Christopher Bennett has recently defended prisoner disenfranchisement as a fair and deserved retributive punishment for crimes, and Mary Sigler and Andrew Altman have argued in favor of prisoner disenfranchisement as a civil restriction. All three proponents agree that disenfranchisement should be reserved for those guilty of the most serious offenses. I assert that (...) it is inappropriate to treat citizens in this manner and will advocate for the right to vote, whether disenfranchisement is perceived as a form of punishment or as a civil measure. I will present two arguments against disenfranchisement as it impacts both citizens and political community at large. First, it excludes citizens from the democratic arena and restricts the opportunity to reintegrate offenders into the political community. While a criminal sentence is intended to be burdensome, the burden associated with disenfranchisement extends beyond the appropriate penal scope. (shrink)

Carlos S. Nino presentó en sus últimos trabajos una defensa de su teoría del castigo que incluía una profunda crítica al retribucionismo. Según su posición, si adoptáramos una teoría retribucionista del castigo, estaríamos asumiendo una versión del subjetivismo penal que abraza el perfeccionismo moral. Nino presenta esta idea sugiriendo que hay un vínculo estrecho entre el retribucionismo, el subjetivismo y el perfeccionismo. En este trabajo, voy a discutir esa relación y criticar el nexo que Nino cree que existe entre ellos. (...) The late Carlos S. Nino presented in his latest work a defense of his theory of punishment which involves a profound critic to retributivism. According with his position if we adopt a retributivist theory of punishment, in addition we are adopting a version of penal subjectivism that embrace moral perfectionism. Nino presents his idea suggesting that there is a chain that linked retribution subjectivism and perfectionism. In this paper, I will discuss the relationship between these three concepts and argue against the links that nino presents between them. (shrink)

Abstract‘Possibilist Explanation’ is a promising account of scientific explanation which avoids the familiar problems of “how-possibly explanations”. It explains an event by showing how-actually it was epistemically possible, instead of why it was epistemically necessary. Its explanandum is the epistemic possibility of an actual event previously considered epistemically impossible. To define PE, two new concepts are introduced: ‘permissive condition’ and ‘possibilist law’. A permissive condition for an event is something that does not entail the event itself, but a necessary condition (...) for it. A ‘Possibilist Law’ is a kind of scientific law that predicts that in the absence of a necessary condition N, the event E is not possible. Both PE and PL are legitimate and neglected parts of scientific knowledge and are especially suitable for human sciences. (shrink)

The problems that arise from the presence of self-attacking ar- guments and odd-length cycles of attack within argumentation frameworks are widely recognized in the literature on defeasible argumentation. This paper introduces two simple semantics to capture different intuitions about what kinds of arguments should become justified in such scenarios. These semantics are modeled upon two extensions of argumentation frameworks, which we call sustainable and tolerant. Each one is constructed on the common ground of the powerful concept of admissibility introduced by (...) Dung in [10]. The novelty of this approach consists in viewing the admissibility of a subset of arguments as relative to potentially challenging subsets of arguments. Both sustainable and tolerant semantics are more credulous than preferred semantics (i.e. they justify at least the same arguments, and possibly more). Given certain sufficient conditions they coincide among them as well as with other semantics introduced by Dung. (shrink)